Law Interpretation No. 6 (2024)

Supreme People's Court Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Monopoly Civil Dispute Cases

(Passed by the 1915th meeting of the Adjudication Committee of the Supreme People's Court on February 4, 2024, effective from July 1, 2024)

In order to maintain fair competition in the market and to adjudicate monopoly civil dispute cases fairly and efficiently according to law, this interpretation is formulated in accordance with the "Civil Code of the People's Republic of China", the "Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China", the "Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China" and other relevant laws.

I. Procedural Provisions

Article 1 The monopoly civil dispute cases referred to in this interpretation are cases in which natural persons, legal persons or unincorporated organizations suffer losses due to monopolistic behavior, or disputes arise due to the contents of contracts or the articles of association, resolutions, decisions, etc. of business operator groups violating the anti-monopoly law, and civil lawsuits are filed with the people's courts in accordance with the anti-monopoly law.

The business operator groups referred to in this interpretation include industry associations and other combinations or unions formed by two or more business operators for the purpose of achieving common goals.

Article 2 If the plaintiff directly files a civil lawsuit with the people's court in accordance with the anti-monopoly law, or files a civil lawsuit with the people's court after the anti-monopoly enforcement agency has determined that a monopoly behavior constitutes a violation, and it meets the acceptance conditions stipulated by law, the people's court shall accept the case.

If the plaintiff sues only to request the people's court to confirm that the defendant's specific behavior constitutes a monopoly, without requesting the defendant to bear civil liability, the people's court shall not accept the case.

Article 3 If one party files a monopoly civil lawsuit with the people's court, and the other party claims that the people's court should not accept it on the grounds that there is a contractual relationship between the two parties and there is an arbitration agreement, the people's court shall not support the claim.

Article 4 The first instance monopoly civil dispute cases shall be under the jurisdiction of intellectual property courts and intermediate people's courts designated by the Supreme People's Court.

Article 5 The territorial jurisdiction of monopoly civil dispute cases shall be determined according to the specific circumstances of the case and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Law and related judicial interpretations concerning infringement disputes, contract disputes, etc.

Article 6 If the plaintiff files a civil lawsuit in accordance with the anti-monopoly law against a defendant who has no domicile within the territory of the People's Republic of China, and claims that the defendant's monopolistic behavior outside the territory has a restrictive or exclusionary effect on competition in the domestic market, the court with jurisdiction shall be determined according to Article 276 of the Civil Procedure Law.

Article 7 If the cause of action at the time of filing is not a monopoly civil dispute, but the people's court finds upon review after accepting the case that it belongs to a monopoly civil dispute, and the court accepting the case does not have jurisdiction over monopoly civil dispute cases, it shall transfer the case to a court with jurisdiction.

Article 8 If two or more plaintiffs file lawsuits with the same people's court with jurisdiction due to the same monopolistic behavior, the people's court may consolidate the cases for trial.

If two or more plaintiffs file lawsuits with different people's courts with jurisdiction due to the same monopolistic behavior, the people's court that subsequently files the case shall transfer the case to the people's court that first filed the case upon discovering that another court with jurisdiction has already filed the case; the court that receives the transferred case may consolidate the cases for trial.

The people's court may require the parties to provide information on administrative enforcement, arbitration, litigation, etc. related to the alleged monopolistic behavior. If the parties refuse to provide truthful information, it may be considered in determining whether they adhere to the principle of good faith and whether it constitutes abuse of rights.

Article 9 If the plaintiff splits the same monopolistic behavior into multiple lawsuits based on factors such as impact region, duration, implementation occasion, and damage scope without justified reasons, the people's court that first accepts the lawsuit shall consolidate the cases for trial.

Article 10 If the anti-monopoly enforcement agency's decision on monopolistic behavior has not been challenged within the statutory period or has been confirmed by an effective court judgment, the plaintiff in the relevant monopoly civil dispute case may assert the basic facts determined by the decision as true without further proof, unless there is sufficient contrary evidence to overturn it.

If necessary, the people's court may require the anti-monopoly enforcement agency that made the decision to explain the relevant circumstances of the decision. If the information, materials, etc. provided by the anti-monopoly enforcement agency have not been made public, the people's court shall take reasonable protective measures ex officio or upon request.

Article 11 The parties may apply to the people's court for one to two persons with specialized knowledge in the field involved in the case, in the field of economics, to appear in court to explain specialized issues.

The parties may apply to the people's court to entrust professional institutions or professionals to provide market research or economic analysis opinions on specialized issues in the case. The professional institution or professional can be determined by negotiation between the parties; if the negotiation fails, it will be designated by the people's court. The people's court may refer to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law and related judicial interpretations on appraisal opinions to examine and judge the market research or economic analysis opinions provided by the professional institutions or professionals.

If one party independently entrusts relevant professional institutions or professionals to provide market research or economic analysis opinions on specialized issues in the case, and the opinions lack reliable facts, data, or other necessary basis, or lack reliable analytical methods, or the other party provides evidence or reasons sufficient to refute them, the people's court shall not accept them.

Article 12 If the monopolistic behavior of an operator damages public interests, the people's procuratorates at the level of a city divided into districts or above may file a civil public interest lawsuit in accordance with the law, applying the relevant laws and judicial interpretations related to public interest litigation, unless otherwise provided in this interpretation.

Article 13 If the anti-monopoly enforcement agency has already initiated an investigation into the alleged monopolistic behavior, the people's court may, based on the specific circumstances of the case, rule to suspend the lawsuit.

II. Definition of the Relevant Market

Article 14 When the plaintiff claims that the alleged monopolistic behavior violates the Anti-Monopoly Law, they generally should define the relevant market as referred to in Article 15, Paragraph 2 of the Anti-Monopoly Law and provide evidence or sufficiently explain the reasons.

If the plaintiff claims that the defendant has a dominant market position or significant market power based on the market share in the relevant market, they should define the relevant market and provide evidence or sufficiently explain the reasons.

The plaintiff may not need to further bear the burden of proof for defining the relevant market if they can directly provide evidence to prove one of the following situations:

1. The operators involved in the alleged monopolistic agreement have significant market power.

2. The operators accused of abusing their dominant market position possess market dominance.

3. The alleged monopolistic behavior has the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.

When the plaintiff claims that the alleged monopolistic behavior falls under the situations specified in Items 1 to 5 of Article 17 and Items 1 and 2 of Paragraph 1 of Article 18 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, they may not need to provide evidence to define the relevant market.

Article 15 When the People's Court defines the relevant product market and relevant geographic market in which operators compete over a certain period for specific goods or services (hereinafter collectively referred to as "products"), it may, based on the specifics of the case, analyze demand substitution from the perspective of demanders, using the specific products directly involved in the alleged monopolistic behavior as the basis. If supply substitution imposes competitive constraints on operators' behavior similar to those of demand substitution, supply substitution analysis from the perspective of suppliers may also be conducted.

When the People's Court conducts demand or supply substitution analysis, it may use the hypothetical monopolist test analysis method. Generally, the hypothetical monopolist test method using price increases is chosen; if competition among operators mainly manifests as non-price competition such as quality, diversity, or innovation, the hypothetical monopolist test method of quality decrease or cost increase can be used.

Article 16 When the People's Court analyzes and defines the relevant product market from the perspective of demand substitution, it generally determines the market composed of a group or category of products that demanders consider having relatively close substitution relationships based on factors such as the characteristics, functions, and uses of the products, the recognition of their quality, the acceptance of their prices, and the ease of obtaining them. From the perspective of supply substitution, the analysis and definition of the relevant product market can comprehensively consider factors such as the intention and ability of other operators to enter the market, the costs and risks they bear, the market barriers they need to overcome, and the time required.

When analyzing and defining the relevant product market involving internet platforms (hereinafter referred to as "platforms"), factors such as the characteristics of the alleged monopolistic behavior, the specific situations where it produces or may produce exclusionary or restrictive competition effects, and the type of platform should be considered. Generally, the relevant product market can be defined based on the side of the platform most related to the alleged monopolistic behavior, or multiple relevant product markets can be defined separately based on the multi-sided products involved in the alleged monopolistic behavior. If necessary, the relevant product market can be defined based on the overall specific platform. If a specific platform has cross-side network effects and imposes sufficient competitive constraints on the platform operator, the relevant product market can be defined based on the overall platform or multiple relevant product markets can be defined separately based on the multi-sided products involved in the cross-side network effects, considering the relationships and impacts between each relevant product market.

Article 17 When the People's Court analyzes and defines the relevant geographic market from the perspective of demand substitution, it can comprehensively consider factors such as the situation where demanders turn to purchase products from other regions due to changes in product prices or other competitive factors, the transportation costs and characteristics of the products, the actual area where most demanders choose products and the distribution of product sales by major operators, market barriers between regions, and the preferences of demanders in specific regions. From the perspective of supply substitution, it can comprehensively consider factors such as the response of operators in other regions to changes in product prices and other competitive factors, and the timeliness and feasibility of operators in other regions supplying or selling related products.

When analyzing and defining the relevant geographic market involved in the platforms, it is important to consider factors such as the actual area where most demanders choose products, the language preferences and consumption habits of demanders, the requirements of relevant laws and regulations, the current status of competitors in other regions, and their timeliness in entering the relevant geographic market.

III. Monopoly Agreements

Article 18 When the People's Court recognizes other concerted actions as stipulated in Article 16 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, it should comprehensively consider the following factors:

1.Whether the market behaviors of the operators are consistent.

2. Whether there has been communication, exchange, or transmission of intent or information between the operators.

3. The market structure, competitive status, and market changes in the relevant market.

4. Whether the operators can provide a reasonable explanation for the consistency of their behavior.

If the plaintiff provides preliminary evidence of items 1 and 2, or items 1 and 3, indicating a high likelihood of concerted action, the defendant should provide evidence or a sufficient explanation to reasonably account for the consistency of their behavior. If a reasonable explanation cannot be provided, the People's Court may recognize the establishment of concerted action.

The reasonable explanation referred to in this article includes that the operator independently implemented the relevant behavior based on market and competitive condition changes.

Article 19 The operators with a competitive relationship as stipulated in Article 17 of the Anti-Monopoly Law refer to two or more actual operators or potential operators who are in the same stage of product production and operation, providing products with relatively close substitution relationships, making independent business decisions, and bearing legal responsibility, or those who may enter the same relevant market for competition.

If a specific operator acquires control over other operators or can exert decisive influence over them, or if two or more operators are controlled or decisively influenced by the same third party, they should be regarded as one economic entity and do not constitute operators with a competitive relationship as referred to in the previous paragraph.

Article 20 If the plaintiff has evidence proving that the agreements reached and implemented by the applicant for generic drugs and the patent holder of the branded drugs meet the following conditions simultaneously and claims that such an agreement constitutes a monopoly agreement as stipulated in Article 17 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the People's Court may support the claim:

1. The patent holder of the branded drugs provides or promises to provide the applicant for generic drugs with obviously unreasonable monetary or other forms of benefit compensation.

2. The applicant for generic drugs promises not to challenge the validity of the patent of the branded drugs or to delay entering the market for the branded drugs.

If the defendant has evidence proving that the benefit compensation referred to in the previous paragraph is solely to compensate for the costs related to resolving the patent dispute or has other legitimate reasons, or that the agreement complies with the provisions of Article 20 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, and claims that it does not constitute a monopoly agreement as stipulated in Article 17 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the People's Court should support the claim.

Article 21 If the alleged monopolistic behavior falls under the monopoly agreements stipulated in Items 1 and 2 of the first paragraph of Article 18 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the defendant shall bear the burden of proof to show that the agreement does not have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.

Article 22 When the People's Court examines and determines whether the alleged monopoly agreement has the effect of eliminating or restricting competition in accordance with the first and second paragraphs of Article 18 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, it can comprehensively consider the following factors:

1. The market power of the defendant in the relevant market and the cumulative effect of the agreement on similar adverse competitive effects in the relevant market.

2. Whether the agreement has adverse competitive effects such as raising market entry barriers, hindering more efficient operators or business models, and restricting competition within or between brands.

3. Whether the agreement has favorable competitive effects such as preventing free riding, promoting competition between brands, maintaining brand image, improving pre-sales or after-sales service levels, promoting innovation, and whether it is necessary to achieve these effects.

4. Other factors that can be considered.

If the evidence in the case is sufficient to prove that the favorable competitive effects significantly outweigh the adverse competitive effects, the People's Court should determine that the agreement does not have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.

Article 23 If the alleged monopoly agreement has any of the following circumstances, and the plaintiff claims that the defendant should bear legal responsibility under the first paragraph of Article 18 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the People's Court shall not support it:

1. The agreement is an agency agreement between the operator and the counterparty, and the agent does not bear any substantial commercial or operational risk.

2. The defendant's market share in the relevant market is below the standard set by the State Council's anti-monopoly enforcement agency and meets other conditions stipulated by the State Council's anti-monopoly enforcement agency.

Article 24 If operators use means such as data, algorithms, technology, etc., to communicate intentions, exchange information, or transmit messages, or use means such as data, algorithms, technology, and platform rules to achieve consistent behavior and reach or implement the alleged monopoly agreement, the People's Court can examine and determine in accordance with the provisions of Article 17 of the Anti-Monopoly Law.

If operators use means such as data, algorithms, technology, and platform rules to achieve price fixing or automated setting of resale product prices, and reach or implement the alleged monopoly agreement, the People's Court can examine and determine in accordance with the provisions of Article 18 of the Anti-Monopoly Law.

Article 25 If an agreement between a platform operator and platform users requires the platform users to offer the same or more favorable transaction conditions on the platform as on other trading channels, the People's Court can distinguish and handle the following situations based on the plaintiff's litigation request and specific circumstances:

1. If there is a competitive relationship between the platform operator and the platform users, it shall be examined and determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 17 of the Anti-Monopoly Law.

2. If there is no competitive relationship between the platform operator and the platform users, it shall be examined and determined in accordance with the provisions of Articles 18 or 19 of the Anti-Monopoly Law.

3. If the plaintiff claims that the platform operator abuses its market dominance, it shall be examined and determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law and Article 22 of the E-Commerce Law.

4. If the plaintiff claims that the platform operator violates the provisions of Article 35 of the E-Commerce Law, it shall be handled in accordance with the provisions of that article.

Article 26 If operators, operator groups, or organizations organize other operators to reach and implement monopoly agreements, causing losses to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff claims that the operators, operator groups, or organizations that organize the behavior and the other operators that reach and implement the monopoly agreements bear joint liability in accordance with the provisions of Article 1168 of the Civil Code, the People's Court shall support it.

If operators, operator groups, etc., provide substantial assistance for other operators to reach and implement monopoly agreements, causing losses to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff claims that the operators, operator groups, etc., that provide assistance and the other operators that reach and implement the monopoly agreements bear joint liability in accordance with the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 1169 of the Civil Code, the People's Court shall support it. However, if the operators, operator groups, etc., can prove that they did not know and should not have known that the other operators reached and implemented the relevant agreements, they are exempt.

The substantial assistance referred to in the previous paragraph refers to behaviors that have direct and significant promoting effects on the conclusion or implementation of the monopoly agreement, such as guiding the formation of illegal intentions, providing convenient conditions, acting as information channels, and helping to implement punishment.

Article 27 If the defendant raises a defense based on the provisions of Items 1 to 5 of the first paragraph of Article 20 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, they shall provide evidence to prove the following facts:

1. The alleged monopoly agreement can achieve the relevant purpose or effect.

2. The alleged monopoly agreement is necessary to achieve the relevant purpose or effect.

3. The alleged monopoly agreement does not severely restrict competition in the relevant market.

4. Consumers can share the benefits generated thereby.

IV. Abuse of Market Dominance

Article 28 When the plaintiff claims that the alleged monopolistic behavior constitutes an abuse of market dominance as stipulated in the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the plaintiff shall bear the burden of proof regarding the defendant's dominant position in the relevant market and the abuse of such dominance. If the defendant argues that its behavior is justified, the burden of proof lies with the defendant.

Article 29 If the plaintiff provides evidence demonstrating that an operator has any of the following circumstances, the People's Court may preliminarily determine that the operator holds a dominant position in the relevant market, based on the market structure and actual competition situation in the specific case, combined with economic principles, unless contrary evidence sufficiently refutes this presumption:

1. The operator maintains prices significantly higher than the competitive market level for an extended period or shows a significant decline in product quality without a substantial loss of users, indicating a clear lack of competition, innovation, and new entrants in the relevant market.

2. The operator maintains a market share significantly higher than that of other operators for an extended period, and the relevant market shows a clear lack of competition, innovation, and new entrants.

The defendant's public information can serve as preliminary evidence to prove the defendant's market dominance, unless sufficiently refuted by contrary evidence.

Article 30 The "market share of the operator in the relevant market" mentioned in Articles 23 and 24 of the Anti-Monopoly Law can be determined based on the proportion of relevant product transaction amounts, transaction volumes, production capacity, or other indicators within a certain period when the alleged monopolistic behavior occurs.

When determining the market share of a platform operator in the relevant market, the People's Court may use transaction amounts, active user numbers, enterprise user numbers, user usage time, traffic volume, click volume, data asset quantity, or other indicators that reflect the actual competition situation in the relevant market.

Article 31 If the plaintiff claims that a public enterprise or other operator with a legally mandated monopoly status abuses its market dominance, the People's Court may determine that the defendant holds a dominant position in the relevant market based on the specific market structure and competition situation, unless sufficiently refuted by contrary evidence.

Article 32 When determining the market dominance of a platform operator under Article 23 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the People's Court may focus on the following factors:

1. The business model of the platform and the actual competitive constraints faced by the platform operator.

2. The market share of the platform operator in the relevant market and the duration of that market share.

3. The existence of significant network effects, scale effects, or scope effects in platform operations.

4. The relevant data, algorithms, and technologies controlled by the platform operator.

5. The influence of the platform operator on adjacent markets.

6. The dependence and counterbalance ability of users or platform operators on the platform operator, lock-in effects, user habits, the use of multiple platforms, and the cost of switching to other platforms.

7. The willingness, ability, scale requirements, technical requirements, legal and policy restrictions, and other market entry barriers faced by other operators entering the relevant market.

8. The innovation and technological changes in the relevant market.

9. Other factors related to platform operations that need to be considered.

Article 33 When determining the market dominance of an operator accused of abusing intellectual property rights under Article 23 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the People's Court may focus on the following factors:

1. The substitutability of specific intellectual property objects in the relevant market, the number of substitutable objects, and the cost of switching to substitute objects.

2. The substitutability of goods provided using the specific intellectual property and the market share of such goods.

3. The counterbalance ability of trading counterparties against the operator holding the specific intellectual property.

4. The innovation and technological changes in the relevant market.

5. Other factors related to the exercise of intellectual property rights that need to be considered.

If the operator argues that market dominance cannot be presumed solely based on the possession of intellectual property rights, the People's Court shall support this claim.

Article 34 Operators presumed to hold joint market dominance under the first and second items of the first paragraph of Article 24 of the Anti-Monopoly Law can rebut this presumption if they provide evidence demonstrating any of the following:

1. The operators do not exhibit behavioral consistency and engage in substantial competition.

2. The operators, as a whole, are subject to effective competitive constraints from other operators in the relevant market.

Article 35 Operators may be found to constitute abuse of market dominance under Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law if they meet the following conditions:

1. Holding a dominant position in the relevant market.

2. Engaging in the alleged monopolistic behavior.

3. The monopolistic behavior has exclusionary or restrictive effects on competition.

4. The monopolistic behavior lacks justifiable reasons.

Article 36 When determining "unfairly high selling prices or unfairly low purchasing prices" as stipulated in the first item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the People's Court may consider the following factors:

1. Whether the return on the product significantly deviates from a reasonable return in a competitive market.

2. Whether the product price significantly deviates from its cost plus reasonable profit under competitive conditions.

3. Whether the price at which the operator sells or buys products from trading counterparts is significantly higher or lower than the price at which the operator sells or buys identical or comparable products in upstream or downstream markets.

4. Whether the price at which the operator sells or buys products from trading counterparts is significantly higher or lower than the price at which other operators sell or buy identical or comparable products under similar conditions.

5. Whether the price at which the operator sells or buys products from trading counterparts is significantly higher or lower than the price at which the operator sells or buys identical or comparable products in other regional markets under similar conditions.

6. Whether the price increase of products sold by the operator to trading counterparts significantly exceeds the operator's cost increase, or whether the price decrease of products purchased by the operator from trading counterparts significantly exceeds the trading counterpart's cost decrease.

7. The duration of the high or low price.

8. Other factors that may be considered.

When determining the "similar conditions" mentioned in items 4 and 5 of the preceding paragraph, factors such as business model, trading channels, supply and demand conditions, regulatory environment, transaction stages, cost structures, transaction conditions, and platform types can be considered.

Article 37 Operators holding market dominance may be preliminarily found to constitute "selling products at prices below cost" as stipulated in the second item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law if they exhibit any of the following:

1. Persistently selling products below average variable cost or average avoidable cost for an extended period.

2. Persistently selling products at prices above average variable cost or average avoidable cost but below average total cost for an extended period, with additional evidence showing a clear intent to exclude or restrict other operators with equivalent efficiency from engaging in effective competition in the relevant market.

When determining whether platform operators are selling products at prices below cost under the preceding paragraph, the cost correlation and reasonableness between various related markets in the multi-sided markets involved in the platform should also be considered.

The People's Court may find the following reasons constitute justifiable grounds for the behavior stipulated in the second item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law:

1. Low-price disposal of perishable goods, seasonal goods, obsolete goods, goods approaching expiration, or overstocked goods.

2. Low-price sales of goods due to debt repayment, production changes, or business closures.

3. Low-price promotions for a reasonable period to promote new products, develop new businesses, or attract new users.

4. Other reasons that can justify the behavior.

Article 38 Operators holding market dominance may be preliminarily found to constitute "refusing to deal with trading counterparts" as stipulated in the third item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law if they exhibit any of the following:

1. Directly refusing to deal with trading counterparts, proposing transaction terms that are clearly unacceptable to trading counterparts, or unreasonably delaying transactions, resulting in the failure to reach a deal.

2. Transactions with trading counterparts are feasible in economic, technical, legal, and safety aspects.

3. The refusal to deal excludes or restricts competition in upstream or downstream markets.

If operators holding market dominance refuse to make their products, platforms, or software systems compatible with those provided by other operators, refuse to open their technology, data, or platform interfaces, or refuse to license their intellectual property without justifiable reasons, the People's Court may consider the following factors when determining such refusal under the third item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law:

1. The feasibility of the operator implementing compatibility, openness, or licensing in economic, technical, legal, and safety aspects.

2. The substitutability and reconstruction cost of the product, platform, software system, technology, data, or intellectual property.

3. The dependence of other operators on the dominant operator's product, platform, software system, technology, data, or intellectual property to engage in effective competition in upstream or downstream markets.

4. The impact of refusal to be compatible, open, or licensed on innovation and the introduction of new products.

5. The impact of implementing compatibility, openness, or licensing on the dominant operator's own business activities and legitimate interests.

6. Whether the refusal to be compatible, open, or licensed substantially excludes or restricts effective competition in the relevant market.

7. Other factors that may be considered.

The People's Court may find the following reasons constitute justifiable grounds for the behavior stipulated in the third item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law:

1. Transactions are not feasible due to force majeure or changed circumstances, or transaction terms and results would be obviously unfair.

2. The trading counterpart is in a state of severe business deterioration, asset transfer, or fund withdrawal to evade debt, or has poor credit records, lost business reputation, engaged in illegal or criminal activities, affecting transaction security.

3. The trading counterpart refuses to accept appropriate transaction terms or fails to comply with reasonable requirements proposed by the operator.

4. Transactions with the trading counterpart would severely damage the legitimate interests of the operator.

5. Other reasons that can justify the behavior.

Article 39 Operators holding market dominance may be preliminarily found to constitute "restricting trading counterparts to deal only with themselves or with designated operators" as stipulated in the fourth item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law if they exhibit any of the following:

1. Directly restricting or imposing transaction conditions, providing transaction guidelines, or otherwise covertly restricting trading counterparts to deal only with themselves or designated operators, or restricting trading counterparts from dealing with specific operators.

2. The restriction on transactions excludes or restricts competition in the relevant market.

When determining whether the restriction on transactions has exclusionary or restrictive effects on competition, the following factors can be considered:

1. The scope, extent, and duration of the restriction.

2. Whether the restriction raises market entry barriers or increases competitors' costs, resulting in market foreclosure effects.

3. If the defendant is a platform operator, the substitutability of platform operators targeted by the restriction, the extent of platform users using multiple alternative platforms, and the cost of switching to other platforms.

4. Whether the restriction substantially deprives trading counterparts of their autonomous choice.

5. Other factors that may be considered.

The People's Court may find the following reasons constitute justifiable grounds for the behavior stipulated in the fourth item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law:

1. Necessary to protect the interests of trading counterparts and consumers.

2. Necessary to meet product safety requirements.

3.Necessary to protect intellectual property or data security.

4. Necessary to protect specific investments made for the transaction.

5. Necessary to maintain a reasonable business model of the platform.

6. Necessary to prevent inappropriate behaviors that would have a negative impact on the entire platform.

7. Other reasons that can justify the behavior.

Article 40 Operators holding market dominance may be preliminarily found to constitute "tying products" as stipulated in the fifth item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law if they exhibit any of the following:

1. Bundling the sale of different products that can be sold separately.

2. Forcing trading counterparts to accept the tied products against their will.

3. The tying behavior excludes or restricts competition in the relevant market.

The term "imposing other unreasonable trading conditions" in the fifth item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law includes the following circumstances:

1. Imposing unreasonable restrictions on the conclusion of transactions, service methods, payment methods, sales regions and targets, after-sales guarantees, etc.

2. Demanding fees or benefits without reasonable grounds beyond the transaction consideration.

3. Imposing transaction conditions unrelated to the transaction involved.

4. Forcing the collection of non-essential user information or data.

5. Imposing non-competition obligations that restrict trading counterparts from improving technology, researching, and developing new products.

The People's Court may find the following reasons constitute justifiable grounds for the behavior stipulated in the fifth item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law:

1. Consistent with legitimate trading habits, consumption habits, or business practices.

2. Necessary to protect the interests of trading counterparts and consumers.

3. Necessary to meet product safety requirements.

4. Necessary for the normal implementation of specific technologies.

5. Necessary to maintain the normal operation of the platform.

6. Other reasons that can justify the behavior.

Article 41 Operators holding market dominance may be preliminarily found to constitute "applying differential treatment to trading counterparts with the same conditions in transaction prices or other transaction conditions" as stipulated in the sixth item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law if they exhibit any of the following:

1. Applying differential treatment to trading counterparts in transaction prices or other transaction conditions for the same products.

2. Compared to the operator's other trading counterparts, the trading counterpart does not have substantial differences in transaction security, transaction costs, scale and capacity, credit status, transaction stages, transaction duration, etc., that affect the transaction.

3. The differential treatment excludes or restricts competition in the relevant market.

If operators holding market dominance sell or buy products at prices higher or lower than those for the same products in upstream or downstream markets, causing profit squeeze on trading counterparts, sufficient to exclude or restrict trading counterparts with equivalent efficiency from engaging in effective competition in the relevant market, the People's Court may preliminarily find that the operator constitutes the differential treatment mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

When determining whether differential treatment has exclusionary or restrictive effects on competition, the following factors can be considered:

1. Whether it excludes or restricts competition between the operator and its competitors.

2. Whether it puts trading counterparts at a competitive disadvantage and excludes or restricts competition in the relevant market.

3. Whether it harms consumer interests and public interests.

4. Other factors that may be considered.

The People's Court may find the following reasons constitute justifiable grounds for the behavior stipulated in the sixth item of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law:

1. Implementing differential treatment according to the actual needs of trading counterparts and consistent with legitimate trading habits, consumption habits, or business practices.

2. Conducting promotional activities for new users' first transactions within a reasonable period.

3. Implementing random transactions based on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory platform rules.

4. Other reasons that can justify the behavior.

Article 42 When operators within a platform file a lawsuit as plaintiffs, claiming that the platform operator abuses its market dominance or engages in other illegal behavior using data, algorithms, technology, platform rules, etc., the People's Court may handle the case based on the plaintiff's claim and specific circumstances, as follows:

1.When the platform operator restricts operators within a platform' transactions through punitive or incentive measures, imposes unreasonable trading conditions on operators within a platform, or applies differential treatment to operators within a platform with the same conditions in transaction prices or other transaction conditions, and the plaintiff claims that the platform operator abuses its market dominance, the People's Court shall determine this according to Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law and Article 22 of the E-Commerce Law.

2. When the plaintiff claims that the platform operator engaging in the aforementioned behavior violates Article 35 of the E-Commerce Law, it shall be handled according to that article.

V. Civil Liability

Article 43 If the defendant’s monopolistic conduct causes losses to the plaintiff, the People's Court may, based on the plaintiff's claim and the facts ascertained, order the defendant to bear civil liability such as ceasing the infringement and compensating for the losses.

If ordering the defendant to cease the alleged monopolistic conduct is insufficient to eliminate the exclusionary or restrictive effect on competition, the People's Court may, based on the plaintiff's claim and specific circumstances, order the defendant to undertake necessary actions to restore competition.

Article 44 The losses suffered by the plaintiff due to the alleged monopolistic conduct include direct losses and the profits that could have been earned under conditions where the conduct did not occur.

In determining the losses suffered by the plaintiff due to the alleged monopolistic conduct, the following factors can be considered:

1. The prices, operating costs, profits, market share, etc., in the relevant market before the implementation or after the cessation of the alleged monopolistic conduct compared to during the implementation period.

2. The prices, operating costs, profits, etc., in comparable markets unaffected by the monopolistic conduct.

3. The prices, operating costs, profits, market share, etc., of comparable operators unaffected by the monopolistic conduct.

4. Other factors that can reasonably prove the losses suffered by the plaintiff due to the alleged monopolistic conduct.

If the plaintiff has evidence proving that the alleged monopolistic conduct has caused losses but finds it difficult to determine the specific amount of loss according to the above provisions, the People's Court may, based on the plaintiff's claims and the case evidence, reasonably determine the amount of compensation, considering the nature, degree, duration of the alleged monopolistic conduct, and the benefits obtained.

Article 45 Based on the plaintiff's claims and specific circumstances, the People's Court may include the reasonable expenses paid by the plaintiff for investigating and stopping the monopolistic conduct, such as reasonable market investigation fees, economic analysis fees, attorney fees, etc., into the scope of loss compensation.

Article 46 If multiple alleged monopolistic conducts are interrelated and cause indivisible overall losses to the plaintiff in the same or multiple relevant markets, the People's Court shall consider the losses as a whole when determining the losses.

If multiple alleged monopolistic conducts are independent and cause losses to the plaintiff in different relevant markets, the People's Court may consider the losses separately when determining the losses.

Article 47 If an operator involved in a horizontal monopoly agreement sues other operators who reached or implemented the agreement for compensation of losses suffered during their participation in the agreement, based on Article 60 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the People's Court shall not support such claims.

Article 48 If a party claims that contracts or the articles of association, resolutions, or decisions of business associations involved in the alleged monopolistic conduct are invalid due to violations of the Anti-Monopoly Law or other mandatory provisions of laws and administrative regulations, the People's Court shall review and determine in accordance with Article 153 of the Civil Code.

If certain clauses in the contracts or the articles of association, resolutions, or decisions of business associations involved in the alleged monopolistic conduct are invalid due to violations of the Anti-Monopoly Law or other mandatory provisions of laws and administrative regulations, and the party claims that other closely related clauses, which do not have independent significance or facilitate the implementation of the alleged monopolistic conduct, should also be invalid, the People's Court may support such claims.

Article 49 The statute of limitations for damages claims arising from monopolistic conduct starts from the date the plaintiff knew or should have known that their rights were infringed and who the obligor is.

If the plaintiff reports the alleged monopolistic conduct to the anti-monopoly enforcement agency, the statute of limitations is interrupted from the date of the report. If the anti-monopoly enforcement agency decides not to file a case, withdraws the case, or decides to terminate the investigation, the statute of limitations period shall recommence from the date the plaintiff knew or should have known of such circumstances.

If the anti-monopoly enforcement agency determines after investigation that monopolistic conduct has been constituted, the statute of limitations period shall recommence from the date the plaintiff knew or should have known that the anti-monopoly enforcement agency's decision has taken legal effect.

VI. Supplementary Provisions

Article 50 When the People's Court hears civil disputes involving monopoly, the Anti-Monopoly Law in effect at the time of the alleged conduct shall apply. If the conduct occurred before the implementation of the amended Anti-Monopoly Law but continued or resulted in damages after the implementation, the amended Anti-Monopoly Law shall apply.

Article 51 This interpretation shall come into effect on July 1, 2024. The "Regulations of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Arising from Monopolistic Conduct" (Law Interpretation [2012] No. 5) shall be repealed simultaneously.

For first-instance and second-instance cases being heard by the People's Court at the time this interpretation comes into effect, this interpretation shall apply; for cases where a final judgment has been made before the implementation of this interpretation, and a party applies for retrial or the case is retried according to the trial supervision procedure, this interpretation shall not apply.